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Thomas Nagel Calls AI Consciousness Debate ‘Just Ridiculous’

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Elderly philosopher seated at a wooden desk in a book-lined study, contrasted with a glowing server data center visible through a window
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Philosopher Thomas Nagel, 89, rejected the idea that large language models are conscious or could soon become conscious, calling the proposition "just ridiculous" in an interview with WIRED's Steven Levy published this week, according to the originating interview.

The comments arrived days after Nagel, a university professor emeritus at New York University, won the $1 million Berggruen Prize for Philosophy & Culture, an annual award for "an individual whose ideas have profoundly shaped human self-understanding and advancement in a rapidly changing world," WIRED reported.

How old is Nagel's bat paper, and why does it matter now?

Nagel's 1974 essay "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" examined whether humans can ever grasp the subjective experience of a nonhuman mind. WIRED noted the paper appeared 52 years before this week's interview, meaning Nagel wrote it in the mid-1970s, long before the current generation of chatbots existed. The piece became a foundational text in philosophy of mind and helped frame decades of later work by Nagel on morality, justice, and consciousness, according to WIRED.

Asked whether the rise of large language models had changed his thinking since then, Nagel told WIRED he is "tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness of these systems compared to the history of earlier AI." But he said that impression does not translate into evidence of machine sentience. "The disposition of some philosophers to take seriously the question whether these things are conscious or might soon become conscious is just ridiculous," Nagel said, according to the interview.

What is functionalism, and why does Nagel reject it for AI?

Nagel told WIRED that philosophers who entertain AI consciousness are relying on functionalism, a position holding that mental states depend on what a system does rather than what it is physically made of. "Functionalism is substrate independent," Nagel said. He argued the more plausible view links specific physical processes, not abstract functions, to mental phenomena. "Complicated data centers have absolutely nothing in common with the physical character of a nervous system," Nagel told WIRED.

His position implies that even a system behaving exactly like a conscious being would not qualify as conscious unless it shared the physical structure — something resembling a nervous system — that Nagel believes consciousness requires. "We have strong reasons to believe that while there may be consciousness elsewhere in the universe, it would require the appearance of some kind of organism with something analogous to a nervous system," he said.

How does the bat problem differ from the AI question?

Nagel's bat essay argued it would be "radically unscientific" to conclude bats lack consciousness simply because humans cannot imagine echolocation-based experience, he told WIRED. Pressed on whether the same logic should extend caution to AI systems, Nagel distinguished the two cases. Bats, he said, are biological organisms with nervous systems, so the uncertainty concerns only the content of their experience, not whether they have any at all. With AI, Nagel argued, the uncertainty is different in kind: the systems lack the physical substrate he believes is a precondition for any subjective experience to occur, biological or otherwise. WIRED's published excerpt of the interview ends before Nagel fully elaborates this distinction, so the complete reasoning behind the claim is not available in the material reviewed for this report.

What is the Berggruen Prize, and who else has won it?

The Berggruen Prize for Philosophy & Culture carries a $1 million award and has previously gone to bioethicist Peter Singer and the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, according to WIRED. Nagel is the author of multiple books, including "What Does It All Mean?," and has written on topics spanning morality, justice, and the mind-body problem over a career that WIRED described as the basis for this year's award.

What happens next in the AI consciousness debate?

Nagel's remarks do not resolve the broader dispute among philosophers and AI researchers over whether functionalist accounts of mind are correct, a question WIRED's interview frames as unsettled within the field itself. The interview, conducted at Nagel's home in Greenwich Village, was edited by WIRED for clarity and length, and the publication noted the exchange reflects Nagel's personal view rather than a consensus position among philosophers of mind.

For readers following the underlying debate, the full interview — including Nagel's extended remarks on subjectivity and the limits of imagining nonhuman experience — is available at WIRED.

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Questions

Does Thomas Nagel think AI chatbots are conscious?

No. Nagel told WIRED it is "just ridiculous" to seriously entertain the question, arguing that data centers share nothing with the physical character of a nervous system.

What prize did Thomas Nagel win and how much is it worth?

Nagel won the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy & Culture, a $1 million annual award previously given to Peter Singer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, according to WIRED.

What is Thomas Nagel's famous bat paper about?

Published 52 years before this week's interview, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" argues humans cannot fully imagine a bat's subjective experience but that this does not mean bats lack consciousness, WIRED reported.

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