Gadi Eisenkot Faces Narrow Path to Form Israeli Government

Gadi Eisenkot, the former Israeli military chief now serving in parliament, has been handed an opening to try to form the country's next government, according to a report from The Economist. The same report cautions that the attempt could still fail because of resistance from both his political opponents and from politicians who might otherwise be counted among his allies.

The Economist's account, published in its Middle East and Africa coverage on Nov. 8, 2026, frames Eisenkot's position as real but unsettled. "Both his foes and his supposed allies may yet prevent him," the publication states in its summary of the moment, underscoring that the obstacles facing a new government do not come from a single direction. Read the Economist's report.

What does it mean to have a chance to form a government in Israel?

In Israel's parliamentary system, forming a government is not simply a matter of winning the most votes. It requires assembling a coalition of parties that together control a working majority in parliament. A candidate given the first opportunity to try carries no guarantee of success; he or she must still negotiate with multiple factions, each weighing its own demands over policy, cabinet posts and legislative priorities before signing on. The Economist's reporting places Eisenkot in that position: in the running, not yet over the finish line.

Why would Eisenkot's political opponents try to block him?

The Economist does not detail the specific tactics each opposing camp might use, but the underlying incentive in any coalition system is straightforward. Rival parties that stand to lose cabinet seats or policy influence if Eisenkot succeeds have reason to withhold cooperation, or to compete for the same coalition partners he needs to reach a majority. Opposition from declared rivals is, in that sense, unsurprising. What The Economist's framing highlights as more notable is resistance from "supposed allies"—politicians whose public posture might suggest support for Eisenkot while their private incentives cut the other way.

Why might Eisenkot's own allies be the bigger threat to his bid?

Coalition politics frequently produces this dynamic. Parties that share broad common ground with a leading candidate can still decline to fall in line if cooperating would cost them independent standing, committee posts or the ability to extract concessions later in negotiations. A lawmaker who looks, on paper, like a natural partner can in practice hold out for a better deal, delay a decision to improve the party's bargaining position, or ultimately back a different candidate if doing so serves the party better. The Economist's characterization—that "supposed allies" are part of what could stop Eisenkot—points to friction inside what might appear, from the outside, to be a friendly bloc.

What happens if Eisenkot cannot assemble a coalition?

Israeli procedure gives a prospective prime minister a limited window to try to build a government once handed the mandate. If that window lapses without a coalition in place, the opportunity can pass to another lawmaker, or the country can move toward another round of elections—an outcome Israel has faced repeatedly during years of fragmented coalition politics. The Economist's report treats Eisenkot's moment as one entry in that longer pattern of close, contested coalition arithmetic rather than a settled outcome.

What is Eisenkot's background before this moment?

Eisenkot built his public profile as a senior military officer before moving into elected politics, a path that sets him apart from Israel's longer-serving party leaders. The Economist's report treats that profile as part of why he has been given a chance to try to form a government now, while stressing that the attempt remains contested on more than one front.

For readers following Israeli politics, the immediate test is not Eisenkot's intentions but the arithmetic: whether enough lawmakers, friendly and unfriendly alike, conclude it serves their own interests to let him succeed. The Economist's reporting leaves that question open, framing both declared opponents and nominal allies as capable of denying him the government he has been given a chance to build.